A lot of journalistic enquiries and an ad hoc national survey showed that the Chernobyl disaster had warped a lingering uneasiness of the Italian public with respect to nuclear technology into an all-out panic concerning the mere idea of physical proximity with nuclear-related artefacts. This public mood was cemented by the 1987 referenda which banned nuclear power as a source of energy. In fact, the overwhelming result against nuclear power, compared with a 65% general turnout, suggests that a significant share of Italian public opinion perceived that moment as a radical break which was offering the implicit promise that the nuclear issue had been solved. Of course, this was not the case. But the Italian public was dangerously left for some time cultivating this constructed promise into the expectation of a ‘de-nuclearized backyard’ for themselves – as many road signs of the time still read nowadays._x000D_
This contribution takes into consideration two case studies, namely the mobilisation against the supposed decision to use an abandoned mine at Pasquasia, Sicily, as a nuclear waste repository – a decision that actually did never occur – and the agonising contrast about the destiny of liquid waste from Trisaia Nuclear Centre in Basilicata. The two cases show how local authorities and at least part of the judiciary critically contributed to the delegitimization of nuclear experts. Following a dystopian scenario, no credibility was acknowledged to them since they were represented as part of an elusive complex of powerful vested interests. This process, in the context of the ‘panic from nuclear proximity’, effectively hamstrung the decommissioning of Trisaia, leading in one case to opt for a course which was not considered technically appropriate from the point of view of radiological safety. _x000D_

Mauro Elli
Department of Historical Studies – State University of Milan

 
ID Abstract: 156